We consider the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among agents with additive valuation functions and explore the connection between two prominent fairness notions: maximum Nash welfare (MNW) and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX). We establish that an MNW allocation is always EFX as long as there are at most two possible values for the goods, whereas this implication is no longer true for three or more distinct values. As a notable consequence, this proves the existence of EFX allocations for these restricted valuation functions. While the efficient computation of an MNW allocation for two possible values remains an open problem, we present a novel algorithm for directly constructing EFX allocations in this se ing. Finally, we study the question of whether an MNW allocation implies any EFX guarantee for general additive valuation functions under a natural new interpretation of approximate EFX allocations.
Introduction
Fair division refers to the general problem of allocating a set of resources to a set of agents in a way satisfying a desired fairness criterion. A well-known example of such a criterion is envy-freeness [Gamow and Stern, 1958; Foley, 1967; Varian, 1974] , where each agent perceives the share she receives to be no worse than what any other agent receives. Since the problem was formally introduced by Banach, Knaster and Steinhaus [Steinhaus, 1948] , fair division has a racted the a ention of various scientific disciplines, including mathematics, economics, and political science. During the last two decades, the algorithmic aspects of fair division have been the focus of a particularly active line of work within the computer science community, e.g., see [Procaccia, 2016; Bouveret et al., 2016; Markakis, 2017] and references therein.
We consider the classic se ing where the resources are indivisible goods that need to be fully allocated and the agents have additive valuation functions. One of the main challenges in this se ing is that classic fairness notions such as equitability, envy-freeness and proportionality-introduced several decades ago having divisible resources in mind-are impossible to satisfy. To see this for envy-freeness, it suffices to consider two agents and one good of value; the agent who does not get the good is going to be envious. * is work has been partially supported by the ERC Advanced Grant 788893 AMDROMA "Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Research in Online Markets", the MIUR PRIN project ALGADIMAR "Algorithms, Games, and Digital Markets", the ERC Starting Grant 639945 ACCORD "Algorithms for Complex Collective Decisions on Structured Domains", and an EPSRC doctoral studentship (Reference 1892947). We would like to thank Ioannis Caragiannis for fruitful discussions at early stages of this work.
is has led to the recent emergence of several weaker fairness notions (see Related work) . As a result, there is a plethora of open questions about the existence, the computation and the interrelationships of such notions. In this work we focus on two of the most prominent: envy-freeness up to any good (EFX) and maximum Nash welfare (MNW). EFX, introduced recently by Caragiannis et al. [2019b] , is an additive relaxation of envy-freeness. Here an agent may envy another agent but only by the value of the least desirable good in the other agent's bundle. While this added flexibility of EFX takes care of extreme pathological cases like the one mentioned above (2 agents, 1 good), this notion is not well understood yet. Despite the active interest in it, it is not known whether EFX allocations always exist, even for 3 agents with additive valuation functions. We consider the problem of proving (or disproving) the existence of EFX allocations to be one of the most intriguing currently open questions in fair division.
e Nash social welfare (or, simply, Nash welfare) is the geometric mean of the agents' utilities. By considering maximum Nash welfare (MNW) allocations, i.e., allocations that maximize the product of the utilities, we achieve some kind of balance between the efficiency of the maximum utilitarian social welfare-the sum of the utilities-and the individual fairness of the maximum egalitarian social welfarethe minimum utility. Although not a fairness concept per se, MNW has strong ties to fairness. In the se ing where the goods are divisible, each (possibly fractional) MNW allocation corresponds to a competitive equilibrium from equal incomes, a market equilibrium (under the assumption that all agents are endowed with the same budget) that is known to guarantee envy-freeness and Pareto optimality [Varian, 1974] . Even in our se ing, Caragiannis et al. [2019b] showed that integral MNW allocations, besides being Pareto optimal, are envy-free up to one good (EF1) and approximately satisfy maximin share fairness up to a Θ(1/ √ n) factor. Both these guarantees are significantly weaker than EFX, in the sense that they are both implied by EFX but they do not imply any approximation of it. In general, MNW does not imply EFX. One of our goals is to identify the cases where it does, in terms of the allowed number of distinct values for the goods. For such cases, we immediately obtain that EFX allocations must exist and then investigate how to efficiently compute them, either through maximizing the Nash welfare or directly. Since, in general, MNW does not even imply a non-trivial approximation of EFX, we further introduce a less stringent, yet natural, new interpretation of approximate EFX and investigate how it is related to MNW.
1.1 Our contribution ere are two variants of EFX used in the related literature, depending on whether only the positively valued goods are considered or not; for the la er case we adopt the name EFX 0 suggested by Kyropoulou et al. [2019] . We start by establishing a strong algorithmic connection between the two variants (Proposition 2.3). en we explore the relationship between maximizing the Nash welfare and achieving EFX or EFX 0 allocations. In doing so, we also obtain some interesting results for the individual notions. In particular:
• In case there are at most two possible values for the goods (2-value instances), we show that any allocation that maximizes the Nash welfare is EFX 0 ( eorem 3.2). is has the following two consequences:
-For any 2-value instance, there exists an EFX 0 allocation. Note that this is the first such existence result for non-identical valuations that holds for any number of agents and goods.
-For the special case of binary valuations, by adapting an algorithm of Barman et al. [2018c] , we can efficiently construct an allocation that is both MNW and EFX 0 .
Note that the implication MNW ⇒ EFX 0 is no longer true for three or more distinct values.
• While for general 2-value instances the efficient computation of an MNW allocation remains an open problem, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for producing EFX 0 allocations in this case ( eorem 4.1). is algorithm, which we call M &F , is based on repeatedly computing maximum matchings and "freezing" certain agents whenever they acquire too much value compared to their peers. We believe these novel ideas might be a stepping stone for proving the existence of EFX allocations in more general se ings.
• We also show that the difficulty of computing EFX allocations does not depend solely on the different number of values, but also on the ratio between the maximum and the minimum value. In particular, for instances where the values of the agents lie in an interval such that the ratio between the maximum and the minimum value is at most 2, we can compute an EFX allocation using a simple variation of the well-known round-robin algorithm ( eorem 4.4).
• For general additive valuations, we show that an MNW allocation does not guarantee any non-trivial approximation of EFX. However, we argue that the current definition of approximate EFX allocations is not always meaningful. Instead, we explore a different natural definition based on the idea of (hypothetically) augmenting an agent's bundle until an EFX-like condition is satisfied. For this new benchmark, which we call EFX-value, we show that any MNW allocation is a 1/2-approximation of EFX ( eorem 5.5).
Related work
As there is a vast literature on fair division, here we focus on the indivisible items se ing and on related fairness notions. e concept of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) was implicitly suggested by Lipton et al. [2004] and formally defined by Budish [2011] . Budish [2011] also introduced the notion of maximin share (MMS), which has been studied extensively [Kurokawa et al., 2018; Amanatidis et al., 2017; Barman and Murthy, 2017; Ghodsi et al., 2018; and has yielded several very interesting variants like pairwise MMS Caragiannis et al. [2019b] , groupwise MMS [Barman et al., 2018a] , and MMS for groups of agents Suksompong [2018] .
As already mentioned, EFX was introduced by Caragiannis et al. [2019b] . Plaut and Roughgarden [2018] defined what an α-approximate EFX (or α-EFX) allocation is and studied exact and approximate EFX allocations with both additive and general valuations. Most of their results, including the existence of EFX allocations for identical valuations, hold under the similar but stricter notion of EFX 0 which is implicitly introduced therein. e currently best 0.618-approximation of either EFX or EFX 0 for the additive case is due to Amanatidis et al. [2020] . For binary additive valuations, Aleksandrov and Walsh [2019] recently proposed an algorithm that produces EFX-but not necessarily EFX 0 -allocations.
Besides [Caragiannis et al., 2019b] , there are several recent papers which relate allocations that maximize (exactly or approximately) the Nash welfare with other fairness notions. Caragiannis et al. [2019a] showed that there exist incomplete allocations that are EFX and in which each agent receives at least half of the value they get in a MNW allocation; Chaudhury et al.
[2020] achieved the same with only a few unallocated goods. Garg and McGlaughlin showed how to get an allocation that 2-approximates the Nash welfare of an MNW allocation that is also proportional up to one good, satisfies a weak MMS guarantee and is Pareto optimal.
Since computing MNW allocations is an APX-hard problem [Lee, 2017] , there is an active interest on special cases or on approximation algorithms. Barman et al. [2018c] show how to efficiently compute MNW allocations for binary additive valuation functions. Cole and Gkatzelis [2018] were the first to obtain a constant approximation algorithm to the MNW objective.
is algorithm, as shown via the improved analysis of Cole et al. [2017] , achieves a factor of 2. e currently best-known factor of 1.45 is due to Barman et al. [2018b] . Going beyond the additive case, in a recent work Garg et al. [2020] study the problem for submodular valuation functions.
Preliminaries and Notation
We consider fair division instances I = (N, M, (v i ) i∈N ) in which there is a set N of n agents and a set M of m indivisible goods. Each agent i ∈ N has a valuation function v i : M → R ≥0 assigning a non-negative real value v i (g) to each good g ∈ M . roughout this work, v i is additive, i.e., v i (A) = g∈A v i (g) for every set (or bundle) of goods A ⊆ M . We pay particular a ention to the following subclasses of additive valuation functions:
• Binary: v i (g) ∈ {0, 1} for every i ∈ N and g ∈ M ;
• k-value: there is a set V consisting of |V | = k distinct, non-negative real values such that v i (g) ∈ V for every i ∈ N and g ∈ M ;
• Interval-value: for every agent i ∈ N there exist two real non-negative numbers x i and y i such that
Of course, any binary instance is a 2-value instance with V = {0, 1}, but we distinguish between these cases as we are able to obtain stronger algorithmic results for the binary case. A complete allocation (or just allocation) A = (A i ) i∈N is a vector listing the bundle A i of goods that each agent i receives, such that A i ∩ A j = ∅ for every i, j ∈ N , and ∪ i∈N A i = M . Our goal is to come up with allocations that are considered to be fair by all agents. We begin by defining envy-freeness and its additive relaxations.
• envy-free up to one good (EF1) if for every pair i, j ∈ N with A j = ∅ there exists a good g ∈ A j , such that
• envy-free up to any (positively-valued) good (EFX) if for every pair i, j ∈ N and every good g
• envy-free up to any good (EFX 0 ) if for every pair i, j ∈ N and every good g ∈ A j , it holds that
By definition, we have EF ⇒ EFX 0 ⇒ EFX ⇒ EF1, but no implication works in the opposite direction. For brevity, we say that agent i is E towards agent j when the criterion of E ∈ {EF, EF1, EFX, EFX 0 } is true for the ordered pair (i, j).
As mentioned in the Introduction, the Nash welfare is usually defined as the geometric mean of the values. Here, for simplicity, we use the product of the values instead. As the allocations (exactly) maximizing the Nash welfare are the same under both definitions, this is without loss of generality.
Definition 2.2. e Nash welfare of an allocation A = (A i ) i∈N is the product of the values of the agents for their bundles: NW(A) = i∈N v i (A i ).
We will usually denote by A * one of the allocations that maximize the Nash welfare (MNW). Among all such allocations, we will sometimes select A * so that some additional properties are satisfied; e.g., see the discussion in Section 3. Caragiannis et al. [2019b] showed that MNW ⇒ EF1, but the exact connection between MNW and the variants of EFX is not well-understood.
Before we dive into our main technical results, we show a somewhat surprising connection between EFX and EFX 0 . In particular, assuming agents with k-value valuation functions, for any k ∈ N, the question of finding an EFX 0 allocation reduces to finding an EFX allocation for an instance with only slightly perturbed valuation functions. An immediate corollary is that the existence (resp. the efficient computation) of EFX allocations for additive agents implies the existence (resp. the efficient computation) of EFX 0 allocations; the converse statements are obvious. Proof. Consider any instance I = (N, M, (v i ) i∈N ). Let δ be the minimum non-zero value difference among any two subsets of goods, according to the valuation function of any agent, that is
Furthermore, pick an arbitrarily small ε ∈ (0, δ m ). Now, let
at is, I ′ is obtained from I by changing any 0 in the valuation functions of the agents to ε. Assume that there exists an EFX allocation A for instance I ′ . We will show that A is also an EFX 0 allocation for I.
Consider any pair of agents i, j ∈ N . Since A is EFX in I ′ , we have thatṽ i (A i ) ≥ṽ i (A j \ g) for every g ∈ A j . Let g * = arg min g∈A j v i (g). Observe that by the choice of ε, g * is the one that must be ignored when we check whether A is EFX 0 for I as well.
• If v i (g * ) = 0, then it must be the case that
contradicting the assumption that A is EFX in I ′ . Hence, i is envy-free towards j.
, and by our choice of ε, we have that
again contradicting the assumption that A is EFX in I ′ . Hence, i is EFX 0 towards j. erefore the computation of an EFX 0 allocation can be reduced to computing an EFX allocation in an instance with slightly perturbed valuation functions as above.
In case the values are rational numbers, this reduction needs only polynomial time as δ is at least 1/D, where D is the denominator of the product of the values of all agents for all goods, and hence it suffices to choose ε ∈ (0, 1 mD ).
3 Maximum Nash Welfare: EFX and Computational Complexity
In this section we focus on allocations that maximize the Nash welfare. We first identify the subclasses of valuation functions for which the MNW allocations are always EFX 0 , and then consider computational complexity questions. Before moving forward, we need to discuss how we handle instances with zero Nash welfare and instances containing zero-valued goods, i.e., goods for which all agents have value 0. 1 Instances with zero Nash welfare. When we talk about the MNW allocations of an instance, the standard interpretation would be to include all complete allocations which achieve the maximum Nash welfare. When it is possible to achieve positive Nash welfare this is indeed true. However, for the extreme case of instances where all allocations have zero Nash welfare we are going to need a refinement. Following the work of Caragiannis et al. [2019b] , we call an allocation an MNW allocation if it (1) maximizes the number of agents with positive value, and then (2) maximizes the product of the values of such agents. e requirements (1) and (2) are by default true for MNW allocations in instances with positive Nash welfare. ey are also necessary because when the Nash welfare is zero, the idea of maximizing it clearly fails to distinguish "good" allocations in any sense. To illustrate this, consider the next instance:
Since the first two agents only like g 1 , the Nash welfare of any allocation is 0. However, not all allocations are EFX 0 . e allocation {∅, ∅, {g 1 , g 2 , g 3 }} is clearly not EFX 0 since the first two agents envy agent 3 even a er the removal of either g 2 or g 3 . Even an allocation such as {{g 1 , g 2 }, ∅, {g 3 }}, which maximizes the number of agents with positive value, is not EFX 0 since agent 2 envies agent 1 even a er the removal of g 2 . On the other hand, the allocation {{g 1 }, ∅, {g 2 , g 3 }}, which maximizes the number of agents with positive value as well as the product of their values, is indeed EFX 0 : the envy of agent 2 towards agent 1 is eliminated by the removal of g 1 .
Instances with zero-valued goods. While, clearly, zero-valued goods do not affect the Nash welfare of an allocation, they do play an important role as to whether this allocation is EFX 0 . To allocate such goods, we first ignore them completely, and compute a Nash welfare maximizing partial allocation B * only for the remaining goods (which are positively valued by some agent), subject to the requirements (1) and (2) in case the Nash welfare is zero. We then obtain the complete MNW allocation A * by allocating all the zero-valued goods to one of the agents with the least value according to B * . 2 Observe that NW(A * ) = NW(B * ), by definition. Allocating the zero-valued goods this way is also necessary as we illustrate next. Consider the same example as above, but with an extra zero-valued good g 4 , such that:
As before, all allocations have zero Nash welfare, and hence we need an allocation that satisfies (1) and (2). e allocation ({g 1 , g 4 }, ∅, {g 2 , g 3 }) is indeed such an allocation: the number of agents with positive value as well as the product of their values are maximized. However, because g 4 has been given to agent 1 (who has value 1) instead of 2 (who has value 0), agent 2 envies agent 1 even a er its, and thus the allocation is not EFX 0 . By moving g 4 to agent 2, we obtain the allocation ({g 1 }, {g 4 }, {g 2 , g 3 }), which maximizes the number of agents with positive value, the product of their values, and gives the all-zero good g 4 to the agent with the least value among all agents, and is indeed EFX 0 as agent 1 has only one good.
When does MNW imply EFX?
Our main result here is that for all 2-value instances any MNW allocation is also EFX 0 . Moreover, this result is tight: there exist 3-value instances for which this implication is no longer true. To simplify the presentation of our results, we distinguish between binary and general 2-value instances.
eorem 3.1. For every binary instance, any MNW allocation is EFX 0 .
Proof. Consider any binary instance I = (N, M, (v i ) i∈N ), and let B * = (B i ) i∈N be the allocation that maximizes the Nash welfare (by maximizing the number of agents with positive value and then the product of their value in case the MNW is zero) for the sub-instance I >0 consisting only of the goods which are positively valued by some agent. en, A * is obtained from B * by allocating the remaining goods (which are valued as zero by all agents) to one of the agents with the least value for their own bundles.
Observe that in I >0 , B * must be such that all agents with positive value get goods which they value as 1 and all agents with zero value get an empty set. Assume otherwise that some agent i gets a good g such that v i (g) = 0. en by moving g to some agent j = i with v j (g) = 1 we can strictly increase either the product of the values of the agents that have positive value or the number of agents that get positive value, a contradiction. Hence, we have that v i (B i ) = |B i |.
We next show that by allocating all the zero-valued goods to some agent i * ∈ arg min i∈N v i (B i ) we have that A * is EFX 0 as long as B * is EFX 0 . We distinguish between two cases depending on whether NW(B * ) > 0 or NW(B * ) = 0.
Consider a pair of agents i and j. If min g∈B j v i (g) = 1, then i must be EFX 0 towards j since i is EF1 towards j, and the two notions coincide. So, from now on we assume that min g∈B j v i (g) = 0. Moreover, we assume that there exists a good in B j that i values as 1, since otherwise i would trivially be EFX 0 towards j, and hence |B j | ≥ 2.
We will show that i is in fact envy-free towards j, and thus
Now, define a new allocation by moving a good in B j that i values as 1 from j to i. e product of the values of the two agents in the new allocation is equal to
Since the bundles of the remaining agents have not changed, the new allocation has strictly higher Nash welfare compared to B * , a contradiction.
Case II: NW(B * ) = 0. Consider a pair of agents i and j. If B i = ∅ and B j = ∅, then they are trivially envy-free towards each other. Also, if B i = ∅ and B j = ∅, we can show that they are EFX 0 towards each other by adapting our arguments for the previous case. Hence, we now focus on the case where B i = ∅ and B j = ∅. If |B j | = 1, then i is trivially EFX 0 towards j. Hence, assume that |B j | ≥ 2. We claim that max g∈B j v i (g) = 0, and consequently i is envy-free towards j. Assume otherwise that there exists a good g ∈ B j such that v i (g) = 1. en, by moving g from j to i we can either obtain positive Nash welfare if i is the only agent with zero value, or we can increase the number of agents with positive value in case the Nash welfare remains equal to 0; since v j (B j ) = |B j | ≥ 2, j still has positive value even a er losing g.
In any case, we conclude that B * is EFX 0 , and consequently A * is EFX 0 as well.
We continue by showing that maximizing the Nash welfare yields an EFX 0 allocation for all 2-value instances. Since a 2-value instance with values a > 1 and b = 0 is equivalent to a binary instance (by normalizing the values), eorem 3.1 above implies that we only need to focus on instances with positive values. Note that in this case EFX 0 coincides with EFX. Proof. Let a > b > 0 and consider any 2-value instance I = (N, M, (v i ) i∈N ) in which v i (g) ∈ {a, b} for every i ∈ N and g ∈ M . Let i and j be any two agents who are given the sets of goods A i and A j in an MNW allocation A * . We say that a good is of type T xy if i and j have values v i (g) = x and v j (g) = y for good g, respectively; so there are four different types of goods: T aa , T ab , T ba and T bb . If min g∈A j v i (g) = a or max g∈A j v i (g) = b, then i is EFX towards j since i is EF1 towards j [Caragiannis et al., 2019b] and the two notions coincide in this case for the pair (i, j). erefore, from now on, we will assume that min g∈A j v i (g) = b and max g∈A j v i (g) = a, which implies that |A j | ≥ 2 and A j includes at least one good of type T ba or T bb .
Case I: ere is at least one good of type T bb in A j . Subcase (a): A j does not include any good of type T ab . Assume, towards a contradiction, that i is not EFX
. We now define a new allocation by moving a good h ∈ A j of type T bb from j to i. In this new allocation, the product of the values of i and j is
Since the allocation of all other agents has not been changed, the new allocation achieves a strictly larger Nash welfare than A * , yielding a contradiction.
Subcase (b):
A j includes at least one good g of type T ab . We will argue about the structure of set A i . If A i includes any good x of type T aa , T ba or T bb , then by exchanging g with x, we obtain an allocation with strictly higher Nash welfare, contradicting the choice of A * . For example, if x is of type T aa , then in the new allocation (a er swapping x and g) agent i has exactly the same value, but agent j's value has strictly increased by an amount a − b > 0. One can verify that the same holds for the other two types. Hence, A i must include only goods of type T ab , which implies that
We create a new allocation by moving a good g ∈ T ab from j to i. e product of the values of i and j then becomes
Since the bundles of the other agents have not been changed, we have that the new allocation has strictly larger Nash welfare than A * , contradicting its choice.
Case II: ere are no goods of type T bb in A j .
en A j includes at least one good of type T ba . If A j includes at least one good of type T ab , then, as we argued in Case I(b) above, in order for A * to be an MNW allocation, A i cannot include any goods of type T aa , T ba or T bb . As a result, A i includes only goods of type T ab and by reproducing the analysis used in Case I(b) it follows that A * is EFX.
So, we may assume that A j includes goods of type T ba and T aa only. is implies that v j (A j ) = |A j |a. Assume towards a contradiction that i is not EFX towards j:
Since A j contains at least one good that i values as b, we also have that v i (A j ) ≤ (|A j | − 1)a + b. Combining the last two expressions, we obtain that
Now, consider the allocation that is obtained from A * by moving a good of type T aa from j to i. We know that such an item exists since max g∈A j v i (g) = a. By using the last inequality, the product of the values of i and j in the new allocation is
which combined with the fact that the bundles of the other agents have not been changed, contradicts the choice of A * . In any case, we conclude that A * must be EFX.
Caragiannis et al.
[2019a] presented a 3-value instance in which no MNW allocation is EFX. For completeness, we include here a simpler such instance, which further shows that the implication MNW ⇒ {EFX, EFX 0 } is no longer true even for interval-value instances in which the length of the interval is almost zero. Let ε be a small positive constant and consider an instance with two agents and three goods with values as shown in in the table:
is is a 3-value instance with values {1 − ε, 1, 1 + ε}. Clearly, it is also an interval-value instance with interval of length 2ε, which can be arbitrarily close to zero by selecting ε to be extremely small. It is easy to verify that there are exactly two allocations achieving the maximum Nash welfare of 2 + ε: A 1 = ({g 2 }, {g 1 , g 3 }) and A 2 = ({g 2 , g 3 }, {g 1 }). e Nash welfare of any other allocation is either 2(1 − ε) or 2 + ε − ε 2 . Now, for ℓ ∈ {1, 2}, observe that in A ℓ agent ℓ is not EFX towards the other agent since she envies her even a er the removal of g ℓ .
On the complexity of maximizing the Nash welfare
We now turn our a ention to the complexity of computing a maximum Nash welfare allocation.
is problem is already known to be hard for many domain restrictions, and easy for only a few special cases. Nevertheless, its complexity for k-value instances with k ∈ {2, 3, 4} has been open. Here we make significant progress towards se ling these cases. We again start with the binary case. Proof. Consider any binary instance I = (N, M, (v i ) i∈N ) and let I >0 be the sub-instance consisting only of the goods that are positively valued by some agent. Given the MNW allocation B * for I >0 , we can obtain the MNW allocation A * for I by augmenting B * so that all the zero-valued goods are given to the agent with minimum value according to B * . So, it remains to compute B * in I >0 .
To do this, we use the greedy algorithm A B of Barman et al. [2018c] which outputs an allocation maximizing the Nash welfare for the binary instance. Let B be the allocation that A B outputs when given as input I >0 . If NW(B) > 0, then B * = B is also EFX 0 by eorem 3.1. However, if NW(B) = 0, in which case all allocations have zero Nash welfare, B might not be an MNW allocation in our sense, i.e., an allocation that maximizes the number of agents with positive value and then the product of their values. Hence, B may not be EFX 0 . To circumvent this, we define a bipartite graph consisting of nodes corresponding to the agents on the le and nodes corresponding to the goods on the right, while an edge between an agent and a good exists if the agent has value 1 for the good. By computing a maximum bipartite matching on this graph, it is guaranteed that the number of agents with positive value is maximized. en, we run A B on the restricted sub-instance of I >0 where the set of agents includes only the ones that participate in the maximum matching, so that the product of their values (which now is going to be positive) is also maximized. is yields the desired allocation B * with maximum Nash welfare for I >0 in which the agents that did not participate in the maximum matching get an empty set.
For general 2-value instances we were unable to resolve the complexity of computing an MNW allocation, but we show that the problem is NP-hard for 3-value instances. is extends the hardness aspect (but not the inapproximability) of the result of Lee [2017] for 5-value instances. eorem 3.4. Computing an MNW allocation is NP-hard, even for 3-value instances.
Proof. We will prove that the problem of deciding whether there exists an allocation that achieves Nash welfare at least some value U is NP-complete. Given an allocation, it is trivial to check whether its Nash welfare is at least U . For the hardness, we give a reduction from a special version of 3SAT, known as 2P2N-3SAT, where every variable appears twice as a positive literal and twice as a negative literal. is problem is known to be NP-complete [Yoshinaka, 2005; Berman et al., 2003] .
Consider an instance of 2P2N-3SAT, in which the set of variables is {x 1 , . . . , x n }, and the set of clauses is {C 1 , . . . , C m }. We will now describe how to construct a 3-value instance with 2m + 5n goods and 3m + 2n agents, where the set of values V consists of a, b = 1 and c = 0, where a > 1/( 2m √ 2 − 1). For each variable x i , introduce two variable-agents {T i , F i }, as well as 5 variable-goods, denoted as {s i,0 , s i,1 , s i,2 , s i,3 , s i,4 }. e values of the variable-agents for the variable-goods are:
• s i,0 : both T i and F i have value a for it; the value of all other variable-agents is 0.
• s i,1 and s i,2 : T i has value 1 for each of them; the value of all other variable-agents is 0.
• s i,3 and s i,4 : F i has value 1 for each of them; the value of all other variable-agents is 0.
For each clause C j = (ℓ 1 ∨ ℓ 2 ∨ ℓ 3 ), where ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 and ℓ 3 are the three literals in the clause, introduce three clause-agents {C 1 j , C 2 j , C 3 j } and two clause-goods {p j , q j }. e values of the clause-agents for all goods as well as the values of the variable-agents for the clause-goods are as follows:
• Both p j and q j are valued as a by the three corresponding clause-agents C 1 j , C 2 j and C 3 j , and as 0 by all other (variable-and clause-) agents.
• For every j, the clause-agent C t j , t ∈ [3] has value 0 for all other goods, besides one:
-If ℓ t = x i , then C t j has value 1 for one of two variable-goods s i,1 , s i,2 (whichever is not valued by some other clause-agent).
-If ℓ t = x i , then C t j has value 1 for one of the two variable-goods s i,3 , s i,4 (whichever is not valued by some other clause-agent).
Note that since there are exactly two occurrences of x i and x i in the 2P2N-3SAT instance, each of the variable-goods s i,1 , s i,2 , s i,3 , s i,4 is valued by exactly two agents (and one of them is always T i or F i ).
Given a satisfying assignment for the 2P2N-3SAT instance, we define the following allocation with Nash welfare at least U = 2 n a 2m+n :
• Variables: If x i = 1, then we allocate s i,0 to T i (for value a) and {s i,3 , s i,4 } to F i (for value 2).
Otherwise (x i = 0), we allocate s i,0 to F i (for value a) and {s i,1 , s i,2 } to T i (for value 2).
• Clauses: Let C j = (ℓ 1 ∨ ℓ 2 ∨ ℓ 3 ). Since C j is satisfied, at least one of ℓ 1 , ℓ 2 or ℓ 3 is true; without loss of generality, assume that ℓ 1 is true. en, we allocate p j to C 2 j (for value a), and q j to C 3 j (again for value a). Note that there is now exactly one good valued by C 1 j that is still unallocated. If ℓ 1 = x i , then this good is one of s i,1 or s i,2 , while if ℓ 1 = x i , then this good is one of s i,3 or s i,4 . In any case, we allocate this good to C 1 j .
• We allocate any remaining goods arbitrarily. Now observe that for any variable x i the product of the values of the two variable-agents T i and F i is at least 2a, and for any clause C j = (ℓ 1 ∨ℓ 2 ∨ℓ 3 ) the product of the values of the three clause-agents C 1 j , C 2 j and C 3 j is at least a 2 . Consequently, the Nash welfare of the resulting allocation is at least (2a) n (a 2 ) m = 2 n a 2m+n .
Conversely, we will now show that given any allocation with Nash welfare at least 2 n a 2m+n , we can obtain a satisfying assignment for the 2P2N-3SAT instance. Without loss of generality, we can assume that every good has been allocated to some agent that has positive value for it. Otherwise, we can modify the allocation so that this holds and the Nash welfare will not decrease. In particular, in any clause C j , the goods p j and q j will be allocated to the agents C 1 j , C 2 j , C 3 j . More specifically, we can assume that p j and q j have been allocated to distinct clause-agents. Suppose otherwise that p j and q j have both been allocated to the same agent, say C 1 j . If one of C 2 j or C 3 j has value 0 (and hence the Nash welfare is 0), then by allocating q j to that agent instead the Nash welfare will not decrease. If both C 2 j and C 3 j have positive value, then this must be equal to 1. Reallocating q j to (say) C 2 j will not decrease the Nash welfare. Indeed, before the modification the product of values was at most 2a + 1 and a er it is at least a(a + 1). By our choice of a, we have 2a + 1 ≤ a(a + 1), so the Nash welfare cannot decrease as a result of this modification.
By the observation above, we can assume that s i,0 has been allocated to T i or F i . If it has been allocated to T i , then we can also assume that goods s i,1 and s i,2 have not been allocated to T i , but instead that they have each been allocated to the unique other agent that values them. Let us show this for s i,1 (the other case is identical). Assume that s i,1 has been allocated to T i and let C t j be the unique other agent that values it. By the above discussion, C t j has obtained at most one of p j and q j . If C t j has value 0, it is easy to see that allocating s i,1 to C t j does not decrease the Nash welfare. If C t j has positive value, then this must be equal to a. Now if T i has utility a + 2, then by allocating s i,1 to C t j instead, the product of values increases from (a + 2)a to (a + 1) 2 . On the other hand, if T i has utility a + 1, then by allocating s i,1 to C t j instead, the product of values remains the same (it goes from (a + 1)a to a(a + 1)). Similarly, if good s i,0 has been allocated to F i , we can assume that goods s i,3 and s i,4 have not been allocated to T i , but instead that they have each been allocated to the unique other agent that values them.
We now construct an assignment for the variables as follows:
• If T i has obtained s i,0 , then we set x i = 1.
• If F i has obtained s i,0 , then we set x i = 0.
We say that the allocation satisfies the consistency property, if the agent in {T i , F i } that has not obtained s i,0 , has obtained all other goods which she values for a total value of 2.
Let us first show that if the allocation satisfies the consistency property, the assignment satisfies the 2P2N-3SAT instance. Observe that for every clause C j , one of the three agents C 1 j , C 2 j or C 3 j will not obtain one of the two clause-goods which they all value as a.
us, this agent has to obtain the single other variable-good which she positively values, otherwise the Nash welfare would be 0. By the consistency property, it follows that the literal associated to this agent must be satisfied. us, the clause is satisfied.
Finally, let us show that if the Nash welfare of the allocation is at least 2 n a 2m+n , then the consistency property holds. Assume that there exists an i such that the agent in {T i , F i } that has not obtained s i,0 , has value strictly less than 2, i.e. at most 1. us, the product of the values of T i and F i is at most a. For any other i ′ , the product of the values of T i ′ and F i ′ is at most 2a. For any clause C j , the product of the values of the three corresponding clause-agents is at most (a + 1) 2 . us, altogether the Nash welfare is at most (a + 1) 2m (2a) n−1 a = 2 n−1 (a + 1) 2m a n . By our choice of a > 1/( 2m √ 2 − 1), we have ensured that (a + 1) 2m < 2a 2m , and so the Nash welfare is indeed strictly less than 2 n a 2m+n .
Computing EFX Allocations for Restricted Domains
Even though we showed that any MNW allocation is also EFX 0 for agents with 2-value valuation functions, it remains an open question whether there exists a polynomial-time algorithm for computing such allocations beyond the binary case. In this section, we try to circumvent this and aim to design efficient algorithms for computing EFX 0 allocations (which might not maximize the Nash welfare) for 2-value instances and interval-value instances.
2-value instances
We begin with considering 2-value instances with values {a, b} such that a > b ≥ 0. Our algorithm, which we call M &F , proceeds in rounds and maintains a set of active agents L, initially containing everyone. In each round, every active agent is given exactly one of the remaining goods, with the possible exception of the last round in which there might not be enough goods le for all agents. e algorithm terminates when all goods have been allocated. Construct the bipartite graph G = (L ∪ R, E).
7:
Compute a maximum matching on G.
8:
for each matched pair (i, g) do 9:
Allocate good g to agent i.
10:
Remove g from R.
11:
for each unmatched active agent i w.r.t. ℓ do 12:
Allocate one arbitrary unallocated good g to i.
13:
14:
Construct the set F of agents that need to freeze.
15:
Remove agents of F from L for the next ⌊a/b − 1⌋ rounds.
16:
Put agents of F to the end of ℓ.
17: return the resulting allocation A.
To determine which good each active agent gets during a round, we create a bipartite graph G = (L ∪ R, E) with nodes corresponding to the active agents L on one side and to the remaining goods R on the other. An edge between an active agent i and a good g exists if and only if v i (g) = a. We first compute a maximum matching on this graph. en each agent gets the good to which she is matched. If there are agents who are not matched to any good and there are still available goods, the unmatched agents receive one arbitrary available good each (subject to availability). ere are two possible reasons why an agent i is not matched to any good in a round: (1) she does not have value a for any good (only b), or (2) the maximum matching is such that all goods for which her value is a are given to other agents. Case (1) does not affect whether the final allocation will be EFX 0 , but case (2) is crucial. is is because agent i might now have much smaller value for her own bundle compared to her value for the bundles of some agents that just received one good each that i values as a. Let Z be the set of these agents. To make up the distance, agent i should possibly receive multiple goods of value b while all agents in Z must freeze for a number of subsequent rounds depending on the ratio a/b.
We define the set F of agents that need to freeze at the end of round r to consist of all those agents who must become inactive because they have obtained too much value from the perspective of other agents (similarly to Case (2) above). Formally, for every active agent i, let g i be the good she gets in round r. We begin by se ing F = {i ∈ L | ∃j ∈ L : v j (g i ) = a, v j (g j ) = b}. en, iteratively, as long as there is an agent i ∈ L \ F such that there exists j ∈ F with v j (g i ) = a, we also add i to F . Each agent in F will remain frozen for the next ⌊a/b − 1⌋ rounds. In the case b = 0, we use the interpretation ⌊a/b − 1⌋ = +∞ in which case agents in F remain frozen forever. Exploiting the properties of the maximum matchings used to allocate goods we can prove that no agent in F will become envious while frozen, and that F is always a strict subset of L. e la er means that there is at least one (non-frozen) active agent at any time, and thus the algorithm will terminate a er at most m rounds. Proof. Let A = (A i ) i∈N be the allocation outpu ed by M &F when given as input a 2-value instance I = (N, M, (v i ) i∈N ) such that v i (g) ∈ {a, b}, a > b ≥ 0, for every i ∈ N and g ∈ M . For any agent i, let r i be the round in which the last goods of value a for agent i were allocated. We will need the following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.2. For every agent i, it holds that:
• She was allocated a good for which she has value a in each of the rounds 1, 2, . . . , r i − 1.
• She can freeze only at the end of round r i , and only if during that round she got a good for which she has value a.
• She can freeze at most once. A er freezing, she has value b for each of the remaining goods.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. For the first part of the lemma, assume that agent i was allocated a good she values as b in some round r < r i . is would mean that agent i was le unmatched in round r. However, in round r i > r there were still goods that i values as a available. Consequently, agent i could also have been matched in round r, which means that we did not use a maximum matching, a contradiction.
For the second and third part of the lemma, consider an agent i that got frozen at the end of some round r. Since agent i = i 0 got frozen, there exist distinct agents i 1 , . . . , i k (k ≤ n) such that v i ℓ (g i ℓ−1 ) = a for ℓ ∈ [k], and v i k (g i k ) = b. Note that agent i k was not matched in round r. Let us now show that the following cases are impossible:
• v i (g i ) = b. is means that agent i = i 0 was also not matched in round r, and out of the agents i 0 , . . . , i k at most k − 1 were matched in round r. However, since v i ℓ (g i ℓ−1 ) = a for every ℓ ∈ [k], we could match agent i ℓ to good g ℓ−1 , and obtain a matching of size k rather than at most k − 1, a contradiction. erefore, it must be v i (g i ) = a.
• r > r i . By the definition of r i , agent i must have been allocated a good she values as b in round r, which is impossible as we showed above. Hence, it must be r ≤ r i .
• r < r i . By the definition of r i , at the end of round r there exists an unallocated good g * such that v i (g * ) = a. Since v i k (g i k ) = b, k of the agents i 0 , . . . , i k were matched in round r. However, by matching agent i ℓ to good g ℓ−1 for each ℓ ∈ [k], and i = i 0 to g * , we can obtain a larger matching of size k + 1 rather than k, a contradiction. erefore, it must be r ≥ r i .
By the last two cases, we have that agent i can only get frozen in round r = r i , and by the definition of r i , the value of i for any of the remaining goods is b.
Lemma 4.3. If at the beginning of some round r > r i , an active agent i is envy-free towards agent j, then agent i will be EFX 0 towards agent j at the end of the algorithm.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. By the second part of Lemma 4.2, agent i is active during all rounds a er r > r i until the end of the algorithm, and i has value b for all remaining goods. Consequently, agent i will be allocated a good she values as b in each subsequent round, except potentially the last round (during which she may not get any good), while the value of i for the bundle of agent j can increase by at most b in each subsequent round as well. Consequently, when the algorithm terminates, v i (A j ) can be at most b more than v i (A i ).
It is easy to see that the algorithm terminates in polynomial time. If no agent ever gets frozen, then the algorithm terminates a er at most ⌈m/n⌉ rounds. Otherwise, let r be the first round in which an agent gets frozen, i.e., there exists some agent j with v j (g j ) = b and some agent i with v j (g i ) = a. By the definition of r j and Lemma 4.2, it follows that r = r j . Furthermore, again by Lemma 4.2, we know that agent j did not get frozen in round r = r j (because v j (g j ) = b), which means that she never gets frozen. Since j gets a good in every round, the algorithm terminates a er at most m rounds.
Let us now show that the algorithm constructs an EFX 0 allocation. If some agent i has value b for all goods, then by the argument in the proof of Lemma 4.3, agent i will be EFX 0 at the end of the algorithm. If there is at least one good which i values as a, then r i is well-defined. Recall that by Lemma 4.2, it holds that agent i is allocated a good she values as a in each of the rounds 1, 2, . . . , r i − 1. In round r i there are two cases:
Case I: Agent i is allocated a good she values as a. en, at the end of round r i , agent i has total value ar i for her bundle and total value at most ar i for the bundle of any other agent. If agent i did not become frozen at the end of round r i (which means she never will), then she will be EFX 0 towards all agents at the end of the algorithm by Lemma 4.3. Now consider the case where agent i froze at the end of round r i .
• Any agent j who obtained a good that i values as a in round r i will also freeze at the end of round r i (by the definition of the set F of frozen agents), and both i and j will re-enter in the same round later. us, since i is envy-free towards j up until round r i and both agents will never freeze again, i will be EFX 0 towards j at the end of the algorithm by Lemma 4.3.
• For any agent j who obtained a good that i values as b, the value of i for the bundle of j at the end of round r i is at most a(r i − 1) + b. Hence, when agent i re-enters (a er the end of round r i + ⌊a/b − 1⌋), her value for j's bundle can be at most a(r i − 1) + b + b⌊a/b − 1⌋ ≤ ar i . us, agent i will be envy-free towards agent j at this point, and EFX 0 towards j at the end of the algorithm by Lemma 4.3. If the algorithm terminates before agent i re-enters (which could happen if b = 0), then agent i is envy-free towards j.
Case II: Agent i is allocated a good she values as b. At the end of round r i her total value is a(r i − 1) + b, and will never freeze by Lemma 4.2.
• For any agent j who obtained a good that i values as b in round r i , the value of i for j's bundle can be at most a(r i − 1) + b. us, agent i is envy-free towards j at the end of r i , and EFX 0 at the end of the algorithm by Lemma 4.3.
• Any agent j who obtained a good that i values as a in round r i must have frozen at the end of round r i . If the algorithm terminates before agent j re-enters (for example, if b = 0), then agent i is EFX 0 with respect to j, because the value of i for j's bundle is at most ar i and the least valuable good from i's perspective is of value a. Otherwise, agent j re-enters before the termination of the algorithm a er the end of round r i + ⌊a/b − 1⌋, and the value of i for j's bundle is still at most ar i , as j did not receive any other good. Since i's own value increased to a(r i − 1) + b + b⌊a/b − 1⌋ > ar i − b, her envy towards agent j is at most b at this point. Furthermore, i has value b for the remaining goods. Because in the last round we prioritize agents who have never go en frozen (which means that if there are less goods than agents, i has priority in ge ing an available good compared to j), by an argument similar to the one used in the proof of Lemma 4.3, it follows that the envy will still be at most b at the end of the algorithm.
is completes the proof.
Interval-value instances
From our discussion thus far, it may seem like the difficultly of proving the existence of EFX 0 allocations is directly related to the number of different values that the agents have, but this is not entirely true. We will now show that the range between the lowest and the highest value also plays a very important role: for specific ranges, and independently of the number of values therein (which can be infinite), computing EFX allocations can be achieved by very simple algorithms. In particular, we show that EFX allocations exist for interval-instances in which the values of each agent i are in some interval [x i , 2x i ], x i ∈ R >0 , by using a simple modification of the round-robin algorithm.
According to this algorithm, we fix an ordering of the agents and then they simply pick their favorite unallocated good one by one, with respect to that ordering.
is continues in rounds of n goods each, until we reach a point where there are not enough goods for everyone. For this last round (if it exists), the agents pick in reverse order (see Algorithm 2). Proof. Let A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) be the allocation produced by Algorithm 2. First observe that if m < n then the statement holds trivially. Hence, we assume that m = kn + ℓ for some k ≥ 1 and 0 ≤ ℓ < n. In this case, the first n − ℓ agents will get k goods and the last ℓ agents will get k + 1 goods. Consider now an agent i and let g ir be the good that she gets in round 1 ≤ r ≤ k +1. We will show that i is EFX towards any other agent j, by distinguishing between cases depending on whether i selects before or a er j according to the main ordering of the algorithm.
Case I: i < j. Agent j either has the same number of goods as i, or one more good than i.
• If both agents get k goods, since i always chooses her most-valuable good before j, we have that v i (g ir ) ≥ v i (g jr ) for every r ∈ [k], and thus i does not envy j.
• If both agents get k + 1 goods or agent i has k goods and agent j has k + 1 goods, let g jt ∈ A j be the least-valuable good according to agent i, which j gets during round t ∈ [k + 1]. If t = k + 1, then
Case II: i > j. Agent j has either the same number of goods as i or one less good than i. Once again, let g jt ∈ A j be the least-valuable good according to agent i. Now observe that in general we have that v i (g ir ) ≥ v i (g j,r+1 ) for every r ∈ [k − 1]. If t = 1, then the statement holds trivially. So, we assume that t ≥ 2.
• If agent j gets k goods, then we have that
So far we have bounded all goods in A j \ {g i t} besides g j1 , using all goods in A i besides g i,k−1 and g i,k (and also g i,k+1 if it exists). Since all the values lie in the interval
• If both agents get k + 1 goods, then we have that v i (g ir ) ≥ v i (g j,r+1 ) for every 1 ≤ r ≤ t − 2 and v i (g ir ) ≥ v i (g j,r+2 ) for every t − 1 ≤ r ≤ k − 1. Again, the values of the goods in A j \ {g i t} besides g j1 have been bounded by the values of the goods in A i besides g ik and g i,k+1 . Since all the values lie in the interval
MNW and the EFX-value
As we saw in Section 3, maximizing the Nash welfare does not yield an EFX allocation in general. Here we take a different route and instead of considering exact EFX allocations, we focus on approximation. We start by showcasing that maximizing the Nash welfare does not guarantee any meaningful approximation of EFX according to the current definition of approximation used in the literature [Plaut and Roughgarden, 2018; Amanatidis et al., 2018 Amanatidis et al., , 2020 Chan et al., 2019] .
Definition 5.1 (α-EFX allocation). For α ∈ (0, 1], an allocation A is α-EFX if for every pair i, j ∈ N and every good g ∈ A j such that v i (g) > 0, it holds that v i (A i ) ≥ αv i (A j \ {g}).
Let w > 1 and ε < 1 2w . Consider the following very simple instance with two agents, three goods, and values given in the table: g 1 g 2 g 3 agent 1 w 0 1/2 agent 2 w 1 ε
We first claim that the allocation A * = (A 1 = {g 1 , g 3 }, A 2 = {g 2 }) is the only one that achieves the maximum Nash welfare of w + 1/2. Indeed, the Nash welfare of any allocation that gives g 2 to agent 1 can only increase by moving g 2 to agent 2, while any allocation other than A * that gives g 2 to agent 2 has Nash welfare either (w + 1)/2 or w + εw < w + 1/2. Notice, however, that A * is not EFX since v 2 (A 2 ) = 1 < w = v 2 (A 1 \ {g 3 }). Instead, it is only 1/w-EFX, an approximation factor that can be arbitrarily close to zero as w becomes large. Nevertheless, A * is not that far away from being an EFX allocation! To see this, consider the allocation B = (B 1 = {g 1 }, B 2 = {g 2 , g 3 }) that is obtained from A * by only moving g 3 from agent 1 to agent 2. Clearly, agent 2 is EFX towards agent 1, as the la er gets only one good. Moreover, the value agent 2 has now is v 2 (B 2 ) = 1 + ε, which is extremely close to the value v 2 (A 2 ) = 1 that agent 2 has in A * . So, even though A * is 1/w-EFX because v 2 (A 2 ) is very low compared to v 2 (A 1 \ {g 3 }), v 2 (A 2 ) is actually very close to the value she would have in a nearby EFX allocation. Consequently, if we accept that agent 2 considers the EFX allocation B as fair, then she should also consider A * as being almost fair.
We say that the value v 2 (B 2 ) = 1 + ε is the EFX-value that agent 2 can achieve by augmenting her bundle with a subset of goods from agent 1 in order to create the closest-to-A * (in terms of value) allocation B which she considers as EFX. en, since v 2 (A 2 ) = 1 1+ε v 2 (B 2 ), agent 2 achieves an approximation of 1 1+ε of her EFX-value. Let us now formalize these notions for any number of agents. Definition 5.2 (EFX-value). Let A = (A 1 , . . . , A n ) be an allocation. For every pair of agents i, j ∈ N , let X ij ⊆ A j be a set of goods such that
Definition 5.3 (α-vEFX allocation). For α ∈ (0, 1], an allocation A is α-vEFX if v i (A i ) ≥ αχ i (A) for every i ∈ N .
We remark that using EFX 0 instead of EFX in the above definitions does not make any difference since adding zeros does not affect the EFX-value. Furthermore, observe that a 1-vEFX allocation is an EFX allocation but not necessarily an EFX 0 allocation. Our first technical result in this section illustrates the connection between approximate EFX and vEFX allocations.
eorem 5.4. For α ∈ (0, 1), an α-EFX allocation is also an α 1+α -vEFX allocation and this guarantee is tight. On the other hand, an α-vEFX allocation is not guaranteed to be β-EFX, for any α, β ∈ (0, 1).
for every pair of agents i, j ∈ N . We can equivalently write this inequality as
Furthermore, by moving all goods in A j \ {g} from j to i, we obtain an allocation in which j gets only one good, and consequently i is EFX towards j. Hence, A is indeed α α+1 -vEFX.
For the upper bound, let α ∈ (0, 1) and consider an instance in which some agent i has values given by the following table:
g 1 g 2 g 3 agent i 1 1/α 1/α
In the allocation A according to which A i = {g 1 } and A j = {g 2 , g 3 } for some agent j = i, agent i is not EFX towards agent j. Since v i (A i ) = 1 and v i (A j \ {g 2 }) = 1/α, we have that A is α-EFX. Now, by moving g 2 from j to i, i becomes EFX towards j, and achieves a total value of v i (A i ) + v i (g 2 ) = 1 + 1/α, yielding an approximation of 1 1/α+1 = α 1+α on her EFX-value. For the reverse relation, let α ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 1−α α . Consider an instance in which the values of some agent i are:
Let A be the allocation according to which A i = {g 1 } and A j = {g 2 , g 3 } for some agent j = i. Since v i (A i ) = 1, agent i can become EFX towards j, by acquiring g 3 , in which case she achieves a value of 1/α. Hence, A is α-vEFX. However, since v i (A j \ {g 3 }) = γ, A is only 1/γ-EFX; the approximation can be arbitrarily close to 0 as γ becomes large.
Even though maximizing the Nash welfare may not yield a β-EFX for any β ∈ (0, 1) as we showed above, it is guaranteed to produce a constant vEFX allocation. eorem 5.5. Any maximum Nash welfare allocation A * is 1/2-vEFX, and this bound is tight.
By using arguments similar to those in the proof of eorem 5.4, we can show that any EF1 allocation is 1/2-vEFX. en, eorem 5.5 follows from the result of Caragiannis et al. [2019b] about MNW implying EF1. Below, we present a direct and self-contained proof of eorem 5.5.
Proof. Consider a pair of agents i and j. Let A i = {a 1 , ..., a |A i | } and A j = {b 1 , ..., b |A j | } be the sets of goods allocated to i and j according to A * , respectively. Without loss of generality, we may assume that 0 ≤ v i (b 1 ) ≤ ... ≤ v i (b |A j | ). Let S = {b 1 , ..., b λ }, λ < |A j | be the subset of least-valued goods of A j such that i is EFX towards j when given the set S (on top of A i ), but is not EFX towards j when given only the set S \ {b λ }. We are going to show that v i (A i ) ≥ v i (S) ⇔ 2v i (A i ) ≥ v i (A i ∪ S). If this is true, then since χ i (A) ≤ v i (A i ∪ S), A * must be 1/2-vEFX.
Assume towards a contradiction that v i (A i ) < v i (S). By its definition, S is such that
Also
Since v j (S) + v j (A j \ S) = v j (A j ), it must be the case that one of v j (S) and v j (A j \ S) is at least v j (A j ) 2 , while the other is at most this much.
• If v j (S) ≤ v j (A j ) 2
and v j (A j \ S) ≥ v j (A j ) 2 , then we define a new allocation in which all goods in S are moved from agent j to agent i. By our assumption that v i (A i ) < v i (S), the product of the new values of the two agents is
Since the sets of goods given to the other agents have not been altered, the new allocation has strictly more Nash welfare than A * , a contradiction.
and v j (A j \ S) ≤ v j (A j ) 2 , then we define another allocation in which all goods in A j \ S are moved from j to i. Since v i (A i ) < v i (A j \ S), the product of the new values of the two agents becomes
again yielding a contradiction.
Consequently, it must be v i (A i ) ≥ v i (S), meaning that A * is 1/2-vEFX.
For the upper bound, consider again the instance used in Section 3 to show that an MNW allocation may not be EFX for 3-value instances. For ease of reference, we repeat the table containing the values of the two agents for the three goods here: g 1 g 2 g 3 agent 1 1 − ε 1 1 + ε agent 2 1 1 − ε 1 + ε
As we argued in Section 3, the allocations A 1 = ({g 2 , g 3 }, {g 1 }) and A 2 = ({g 2 }, {g 1 , g 3 }) are the only Nash welfare maximizing ones. Both of these are 1 2−ε -vEFX since the envious agent can get the least-valued good from the other agent (worth 1 − ε) and become EFX.
Directions for Future Work
We studied the connection between two celebrated notions, that of maximum Nash welfare and envyfreeness up to any good. We showed that a maximum Nash welfare allocation is always EFX 0 for 2-value instances, while this implication is no longer true for k-value instances with k ≥ 3. e first question that our work leaves open is whether it is possible to compute in polynomial-time an allocation that maximizes the Nash welfare for 2-value instances.
Nevertheless, for 2-value instances we presented a polynomial-time algorithm for computing an EFX 0 allocation. Due to its novelty, we believe that the idea of repeatedly computing maximum matchings and freezing certain agents whenever they acquire too much value (compared to other agents), might be a stepping stone for proving the existence of EFX 0 more generally. at being said, while generalizing our algorithm to k-value instances with k ≥ 3 definitely deserves further investigation, it does seem to be a highly non-trivial task.
Finally, going beyond exact MNW or EFX allocations, we discussed the connection between MNW and approximate EFX allocations. While an MNW allocation does not necessarily provide any meaningful guarantee according to the commonly used definition of approximation, we showed that it does under a new interpretation of approximation via the EFX-value. A natural question is whether one can design polynomial-time algorithms with strong approximation guarantees for both the EFX-value and the Nash welfare.
